Thursday, September 26, 2019

French colonisation in popular culture of francophone countries Personal Statement

French colonisation in popular culture of francophone countries - Personal Statement Example With the French culture spreading beyond the national boundaries, one would argue that one of the major implications of the French colonization led to the spread of French language to Africans. Sonnenburg continues to emphasize that the French assumed the African syntax and made it obligatory for the Africans to speak French, a policy referred to as the assimilation process (221). Centuries later, the Francophone countries still use French as their official language. Africans adopted the Frenchman way of living. The mode of dressing changed for the Africans. Regardless of copious protests against the revolution of the Africans to Frenchmen, the French managed to change the Africans. With time, studies indicate that Africans were able to change their lifestyles to French to extent that to be elected in the legislative assembly, Africans had to lead a life similar to that of the Frenchman (220). In the case of Tunisia for example, nearly all the elite and government officials had been assimilated to being Frenchmen. Eradication of the French language and replace it with the indigenous Arabic language was completely tasking for the Tunisians. With French literacy elevated in Tunisia, this is yet another impact on the culture of Francophone colonies of Africa. In a study of colonization and France with its spheres of influence, France ought not to be linked to colonization. France has been associated with education and spread of the same to other generations (223). In one way or another, it would arguable that the French brainwashed their colonies into accepting their language and culture; thus, entire loss of the African identity. As opposed to coercion like other colonial masters, the French managed to influence he colonies into embracing the Frenchman way of living (222). Francophone countries became multicultural societies embodied with a blend of both African culture- in minute forms, and the French culture dominating the way

Wednesday, September 25, 2019

PROJECT mANAGEMENT( CASE STUDY) Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1500 words

PROJECT mANAGEMENT( CASE STUDY) - Essay Example Number in the top of the set is the time this activity individual requires or the total time allocated to complete this activity. Compartment with 0 carries the point in time particular activity can be started. Therefore Activity A can be started at 0 point in time means that as soon as the project started and it is the Earliest Start Time (Anantatmula, 2010). Whereas Compartment with 7 refers total time consumed after completing this particular activity which means it shows the Earliest Finish Time (Brotherton, Fried, and Norman, 2008). Bottom right compartment is the time of latest finish activity. For instance, activity can be finished at the latest by 10 weeks and any further delay than 10 weeks would impact total duration of the project. Number below the complete box refers the amount of time (weeks in under study case) this particular activity can be delayed without affecting the total project time; called float (Brotherton, Fried, and Norman, 2008). For instance, activity A ca n be delayed to maximum of 3 weeks without affecting the total project time. This delay would also allow this activity to be included in the critical path and as the gap available for delay would entirely be consumed by the initially activity. So an activity can be represented as follows: Duration of the project Earliest Start Time A Earliest Finish Time Latest Start Time Latest finish Time float Path identified with red arrow is the critical path. Critical path refers to path or the flow of activities that are critically dependent on each other and delay in these activities would immediately result in delay of the project. Critical path of this project includes following activities: B-E-H-J-K-L. It is identified with activities that have zero (0) float; referring to no time cushion to delay this particular activity. It is the longest path and any delay in these activities will delay the entire project. The float of the activity D and F are 3 weeks and 1 week respectively. This mean s that activity D and activity F can be delayed by 3 weeks and 1 week respectively and this delay would have no impact on the duration of the project and project will be still completed on time. However, any delays in these activities with more than the stated time would impact completion of project on time (Alojairi, and Safayeni, 2009). Activity F has a float of 1 week and delay in this would affect the overall time required to complete the project. Manager in order to reduce time for delay in the critical path can take the benefit of float of F and G and shall take up both activities parallel. Hence, this way, two weeks benefit will be in hand to project manager. Within these two weeks manager can allocate additional resources for such as multiple panel for hiring and training staff in order to complete the project within due time or minimizing the delay. ANSWER # 1 (b) Each component of the project plays its part in order to complete the project within the duration. However, amo ng large number of factors few are regarded as critical and discrepancy on these factors such as delays can resultantly cause the delay of the entire project along with cost also being affected. Being critical these factors require considerable attention to ensure minimization of the discrepancy chances (Bredillet, 2005). For the given project of developing petrol station with convenience stores being market already explored by Tesco Metro and Sainsbury’s Local but with distinction to exploit the high income class

Tuesday, September 24, 2019

The Great Crew Change Research Paper Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1250 words

The Great Crew Change - Research Paper Example This crisis which resulted into a significant gap in the workforce by both ages and experience was referred to as the great crew change. The great crew change has created major dilemmas to the oil industry as the baby boomers are currently approaching their retirement age leaving insufficient and less experienced workers to continue with the projects. This presents a possibility of losing the tribal knowledge in the sector, irrespective of how hard and vigorous the recruitment drive is done. This paper will therefore discuss the impacts of the great crew change, its scope of effect and the overall steps that have been made to mitigate the situation (Clark, Davidson, Guilford & Parry, 2006). The expected mass exodus of experienced petroleum engineers is expected to have impacts on various countries including but not excluded to the United States. The depression that affected the oil industry in the 80s and 90s affected major developed economies and this has been attributed to the experience gap that is currently witnessed in the industry. Companies operating in the oil and gas industries in different countries of the world are facing the great crew change according to a workforce forum conducted in cape town in 2008. Despite the fact that the United States statistics on workforce gap being available, the effects have been felt in other countries with some countries suffering from the knowledge gap most (Irgens, 2008). According to the Brazilian NOC petrobras, the 90s was occasioned by minimal recruitment of geoscientists and petroleum engineers. This resulted into a situation where the scientists in the company either have 10 years less experience or even more that 20 in some instances. The Indian economy and oil industry has also been affected by this phenomenon according to the Indian national oil company which believes that the perceptions that were created in the 80s and 90s pushed away potential engineers (Clark,

Monday, September 23, 2019

Depending on your choice; Either Organisational culture OR Leadership Essay

Depending on your choice; Either Organisational culture OR Leadership - Essay Example (HP) managed to become the biggest global seller of PC with a total of 49,434 shipments and 18.2% market share back in 2007 (Pettey, 2008). It line with this, the company offers a wide-range of products and services related to digital photography and entertainment as well as computer related products such as PC, laptops, and printers for personal and business use aside from large IT storage, servers, and software. (HP, 2008a) For this study, organizational culture of Tesco and HP will be identified and examined followed by determining which among the two organizations have a stronger organizational control. In the process of going through the main discussion, its respective managers’ approach to control organizational culture will be tackled in details. Organizational culture is â€Å"a set of norms, beliefs, principles and behaviour that gives the organization a unique character† (Brown, 1995). Once a company has formed a positive cultural practice within a business organization, there is a higher chance for the company to cope with internal and external business challenges. For instance: Setting a positive perception about organizational change on employees can make it easier for a business to deal with a wide-range of business challenges which contributes to the increase in the company’s annual revenues and profitability. Likewise, setting a positive organizational culture can help the managers create a more conducive working environment which could significantly increase the work performance of its employees (Armstrong, 2007). When it comes to setting organizational culture, Tesco considers not only the welfare of its loyal and prospective customers but also its existing employees. As part of improving its customer services in each of the Tesco stores, the company make it a habit to increase the number of its staff to help out in addressing the main concerns of its customers (Tesco, 2009a). On the other hand, HR management of

Sunday, September 22, 2019

More Than Just a Story Essay Example for Free

More Than Just a Story Essay Joanna Bartee’s critical essay of Kate Chopin’s short story, The Storm, maintains that the entire story is an allegorical look at feminism and sexual reservations in the Nineteenth Century. She maintains that the storm is a metaphor for the pent up sexual energy that culminates in an extramarital affair while Calixta’s husband and son ride out the actual storm at a small grocer’s store nearby. Bartee points out that Chopin was in touch with her own feelings regarding sexuality and through this story she was able to express her views though she chose not to make them known through publication in her lifetime. Freud said that sometimes a cigar is just a cigar; the opposite is also true. Bartee makes an effective argument that her assessment is correct by backing up her opinions with pertinent blocks of dialogue from the story and by simply pointing out the obvious. To begin Bartee says that the title of Chopin’s short story has a dual meaning, and though the tale unfolds during a raging storm, the storm of the title is representative of repressed human female sexuality. While Alcee comes to the home of Calixta seeking refuge from the storm it is more a rhetorical device to enable the plot to unfold as it does. The physical storm is irrelevant to the actual theme, which is sexuality and human desire. Bartee says that initially the story begins with just the facts that can be gleaned from a read, assuming the reader is capable of taking a bit of latitude. She tells us that the two main characters, Calixta and Alcee, were once lovers and have now met in the present time of the short story, during a powerful storm. She is reading more into this assessment than is actually said in the story when she declares, â€Å"†¦Calixta and Alcee, had a flirtation several years before the story takes place, but each made a more suitable marriage to someone else and they have not seen each other since,† (Bartee). It is known from the story that they had a flirtation but as for each making a more advantageous marriage, that seems to be speculation. Joanne Bartee’s essay addresses the title, saying that ‘The Storm† is metaphor for the pent up passions of a Victorian period. It seems logical that this is the case, for the author flaunts it at every opportunity. She says, â€Å"They did not heed the crashing torrents, and the roar of the elements made her laugh as she lay in his arms,† (Chopin II-20), to describe the passion of the two. Then she says, â€Å"The rain was over; and the sun was turning the glistening green world into a palace of gems. Calixta, on the gallery, watched Alcee ride away,† (Chopin III-1) to describe the parting of the two, saying that the storm of passion had ebbed. Bartee quotes critic Robert Wilson as well, saying that Wilson believes, Chopin’s title refers to nature, which is symbolically feminine; the storm can therefore be seen as symbolic of feminine sexuality and passion. † Bartee points out that Claxita is the essence of domesticity as the story opens, totally unaware of an impending storm. This storm will not only be the one of nature but rather the storm of her pent up desires, released when her former paramour arrives unexpectedly. She is sewing, while her husband’s Sunday clothes are airing out on the porch. Bartee believes this is an allusion to polite and proper society in that Sunday clothes can be taken to mean those clothes that her husband would wear to church, accompanied by his wife and child. Early in her critique Bartee says that the entire short story is filled with illustrations of how the storm is the driving force and main theme of Chopin’s story. She also points out that the story was published posthumously, years later, indicating, perhaps, a reluctance to share her views with a Victorian public, believing it was too graphic to be read with her name attached to it. While it is mild by today’s standards, at the time that it was written it must have been considered a bit risque to have a woman author put her name to a story to obviously full of not only secret sexual desires and passions but infidelity and adultery. The idea that the storm passes just as the tryst is completed and Alcee is riding way is certainly an indication that the natural storm and the storm of passions, which have obviously been sated, are one and the same. Bartee points out that Calixta’s husband, Bobinot, wisely waits out the storm at the general store just as he avoids the passions of wife as well. He is aware of what the natural storm can do and does not intend to let it batter him, likewise, Bartee says, he is aware of the passions of which his wife is capable and he does not mean to allow himself to be battered that the emotional storm brewing in his wife’s psyche. Bartee believes that Bobinot is aware of the situation, though this seems to be conjecture on her part. If this is the case then Bobinot is hiding from the passions of a wife by avoidance, and there is not enough information given to make that claim. Bartee points out the obvious with clarity and most of what she says seems logical, but at this point she appears to be taking a leap of imagination that is not justified by the text of Kate Chopin. Calixta seems content to do her familial chores, tending to her home and seeing to her husband’s clothes. Bartee says at this point that many of the chores that she has to do are done in obvious frustration and are also symbols of the sexual repression of this Nineteenth Century homemaker. This may be the correct assessment as Chopin says that Calixta, â€Å" †¦ unfastened her white sacque at the throat. It began to grow dark, and suddenly realizing the situation she got up hurriedly and went about closing windows and door,† (Chopin II-1). This, Bartee implies, is the foreshadowing that a bad storm is about to blow, and it may overwhelm her. She is leery of how bad it is going to get and takes some nominal precautions to protect her home from the approaching storm. Bartee does not address the symbolism inherent in the actions of Calixta during the initial meeting of the two former intimates. Alcee asks for permission to take shelter on Calixta’s porch, but they both quickly realize that such shelter is totally ineffective against the fury of the storm, which, obviously at this point is not only refers to the weather but more pointedly, to the raging emotions beginning to build in the man and woman. When Calixta invites Alcee into the home of her family it is virtually a paradigm shift in her attitude toward both the old flame and to her duties as wife and mother. â€Å"He expressed an intention to remain outside, but it was soon apparent that he might as well have been out in the open,† (Chopin II-5). The two then find it appropriate to ‘put something under the door’, to further isolate them from the outside world. The description of her husband’s clothing, intimate possessions, which cover and protect a man, are exposed outside the home. There is a real possibility that they can be lost, damaged or destroyed, just as her marriage can be lost, damaged or destroyed by her emotional storm of passion. This symbolism of them hanging outside, exposed to the elements, Bartee says, is symbolic of the danger that Calixta feels concerning the approach of the storm. He husband’s intimate possessions are in danger of being destroyed or lost. Bartee writes, â€Å"They are in danger of blowing away from the strong winds that are approaching with the storm,† (Bartee). Alcee grabs Bobinot’s pants, which, Bartee says Wilson describes as a subversion of the constraints which Calixta, as a married woman, should be feeling. Bartee likewise correctly assesses the description Chopin gives the reader of symbolically putting away a cotton sheet. This sheet, that covers a marriage bed, is in sight when Alcee arrives, but as the two characters talk, Calixta pointedly puts the sheet out of sight, and, if could be inferred, out of mind. Bartee does not mention that the author describes the view she has of the marriage bed itself and that Calixta is aware that the son’s sleeping couch are in view as well. This could also be taken as symbolic of the intimate glimpse Calixta is permitting a virtual stranger, an outsider to her family, to have of her home and private life. Chopin describes the scene thus, â€Å" The door stood open, and the room with its white, monumental bed, its closed shutters, looked dim and mysterious,† (Chopin II-9). Bartee’s opinion is that in symbolically putting away the cotton sheet, an object of domesticity, getting it out of their sight, Calixta is now symbolically clearing her mind, removing any obstacles that might stand in the way of the two as they move inexorably toward the inevitable passionate union toward which the story has been leading. Bartee quotes lines from the story saying that not only do the two lovers lack any remorse, they feel renewed and invigorated by their act. Bartee says, â€Å"Chopin writes, So the storm passed and everyone was happy. † Bartee does not mention what seems to be more than a casual comment immediately prior to that line. Chopin’s penultimate line reads, â€Å" Devoted as she was to her husband, their intimate conjugal life was something which she was more than willing to forego for a while. † This refers to the wife of Alcee, who, it seems, although unaware of the details of the tryst and the storm, has profited from it. The fact that everyone is happy must therefore include Alcee’s wife, and she is temporarily relieved of the more mundane of her ‘wifely duties’. Still, Bartee makes an effective argument that her view is correct by backing up her opinions with pertinent blocks of dialogue from the story and by simply pointing out the obvious. Works Cited Bartee, J. The Storm: More Than Just a Story Retrieved 5-23-07 from http://facultystaff. vwc. edu/~cbellamy/Southern%20Literature/SL%20Chopin. htm Chopin, K. The Storm 1898

Saturday, September 21, 2019

Obama and Bush in the Iraq war Essay Example for Free

Obama and Bush in the Iraq war Essay On April 11, 1991, the Gulf war ended with a cease fire that was negotiated between the United States and its allies and Iraq. A policy of containment was maintained by the United States and its allies towards Iraq. This policy encompassed various economic sanctions by the United Nations Security Council, the enforcement by the United States and United Kingdom of Iraqi no flying zones and inspections to prevent Iraq from developing chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. In October 1998, the United States official policy toward Iraq became regime change with the enactment of the Iraqi liberation act. The act provided for the transition of Iraq to a democracy following the withdrawal of United Nations weapons inspectors. This legislation however did not correspond with the terms that were set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 which basically focused on weapons and weapons programs and made no mention of change of regime. The United States and the United Kingdom launched the Operation Desert Fox one month after the Iraq Liberation Act was passed. The rationale behind the campaign was to restrict the ability of Saddams government to produce chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. On the other hand, United States national security personnel hoped that the exercise would weaken Saddams grip on power. With the election of Bush as the United States president in 2000, the United States became actively inclined toward the policy of regime change in Iraq. The Republicans campaign became prior to the elections called for complete implementation of Iraq Liberation Act and the ousting of Saddam. The invasion of Iraq may have been planned since the inauguration with the first National security meeting discussing the invasion (Hamilton, 2004). However, there are also claims that the National Security Council discussions were a continuation of Clintons administrations foreign policy. However, little formal step was made by the Bushs administration toward invasion despite its stated interest in liberating Iraq until the September 11, 2001 attacks on the twin towers. The rationale behind the invasion of Iraq after the 9/11 attacks has been questioned as there was little to suggest that Saddam had any cooperation with Al Qaeda. Shortly after the attack, President Bush announced the new war on terrorism which was backed by the doctrine of preemptive military action. Why Bush Started the War The Bushs administration considered Saddam Hussein to be a major distraction and threat not only to American security but also to global peace. As such, the only way to guarantee the global stability and peace was by ousting Saddams regime. The administration believed that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction and thus rushed to conquer the country before they could fire any weapon. The administration also believed that Saddam was a major sponsor of terrorists and with the 9/11 attacks, the American people were thirsting for some form of action. The electorate of the United States was skillfully convinced that the best solution to the problem of terrorism was to get Saddam Hussein. As such, the main reason that was given by the Bushs administration as a justification for the invasion was the Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. Other reasons were that Saddam supported terrorism and held the people of Iraq captive. Another primary motive which was however not stated with regard to the invasion of Iraq was the consolidation of oil resources in Iraq (Holtzman, 2006). A report which was commissioned before the September attacks by Dick Cheney indicated unambiguously identifies Iraq as the main destabilizing influence to the flow of oil to the international markets from the Middle East. The report also indicated that Saddam had expressed a willingness to threaten to employ the oil weapon and to use his own export program to influence and manipulate oil markets. Iraq was a destabilizing influence to global oil flow from the Middle East and therefore United States military intervention was inevitable (Moore, 2004). Within the American grand design for the world, oil plays a major role. The Middle East id the only place that is capable of satisfying the demand for oil as it contains the world’s largest reserves. An increase in the demand for oil was conceived by the Bush administration as inevitable, and Iraq was a stumbling block. The invasion was thus necessary for the United States to guarantee its energy needs. By securing a strategic position in the Gulf region through establishing a friendly and compliant government in Iraq, the United States will not only manage check the OPEC but also influence the conduct of other global powers. Why Obama is against the war According to Obama, Iraqs invasion without any clear rationale and without strong international support had the capacity to lead to instability not only in Iraq but also in the Middle East (Ambinder, 2007). The invasion, according to him, would fuel sectarian warfare. The Sunnis, having been empowered by Saddam, were likely to discover that they were the targets of Shia radicals who sought for revenge for the way that they were treated and power to control Iraqs future. Iraqs insurgency will thus be inspired, not only by the desire to kill the Americans but also by the ambition to be in power when the United States leaves. Obama also opposed the war because he envisioned a situation whereby the attacks would increase leading to the death of more American young people. The difference between Obama and Bush with regard to Iraqi war became clear in 2007. The year marked a critical turning point in the war in Iraq. It was during this period that Iraq sunk into a state of savage sectarian chaos with three thousand civilians dying every month. It was also during this period that the American people lost hope in the war and were thus prepared to bring the troops back to America. However, instead of letting the soldiers go back to America, a move that was favored by both Republicans and Democrats, Bush ordered a troop surge to ease the violence, suppress al Qaeda in Iraq and set the stage for political reconciliation. Obama had much to say concerning this issue, predicting that the surge would not be effective (Stone, 2009). Obama was not convinced that the twenty thousand additional troops would not solve the sectarian violence in Iraq. According to him, the effect will instead be reversed (Obama, 2002). This move, in his view, would not solve the long term political strife between the ethnic and religious groups in Iraq. Obama believed that strategic defense is a much more preferable approach to the entire war, an idea that many people seem to agree with. He opposed the war on the premise that the United states did not know how much it was going to cost, what the exit strategy would be and how the invasion itself will affect the relationship of the United States with the rest of the world. Again, he doubted the soundness of the American intelligence and held that capturing Bin Laden ought to have been the priority. Obama felt that because Al Qaeda had not been put to rest, it may act as distraction. Obama conceived of the invasion of Iraq unwise use of the military. According to him, the invasion brought more problems than solutions as more and more money was being used, more American soldiers were being killed and Al Qaeda had grown stronger. With regard to the reduction of the surge due to the deployment of more troops, Obama felt that it the reduction of violence was mainly as a result of the sacrifice by the soldiers. According to Obama, the Bush administrations judgment concerning the length of the war, the conception of America by the Iraqis as the liberator and the view that there was no history of violence between the Shiite and the Sunni were all wrong. Obama referred to the war in Iraq as a dangerous distraction. His view is that central front in the war on terror was never Iraq but the terrorist themselves. As such, his position is that the terrorists should be attacked directly. His new strategy has therefore been to directly fight Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. His first priority has been to end the war in Iraq as he had opposed it from the onset. With his position that the war in Iraq was unnecessary, Obama has made it his responsibility to redeploy the United States combat troops that propel Iraqi leaders toward a political solution, rebuild the military and refocus on Afghanistan and broader American security interests. His plan is to remove the combat brigades from Iraq by 2010 and to send additional combat brigades to Afghanistan. The worth of Iraqi war Assessing the worth of Iraq war requires that one reflects upon whatever would have happened in the Bush administration would have not gone to war in March 2003. There is no secret concerning the things that have gone wrong ever since the United States invaded Iraq but it cannot also be assumed that everything would have gone right if the United States had not invaded Iraq. It is a fact that there was a heavy casualty which does not go well with the American public. However, there is need to address what the alternative to war would have meant. Many people agree that Saddam was not the best leader. Other individuals like Madeleine Albright compared him to Hitler, a comparison that cannot be far from the truth in many respects. Saddam had contempt for human life, killing thousands of his own citizens beside threatening and butchering his neighbors. It may therefore be argued that removing such a man from power was worth some sacrifice. A more intriguing question is however whether the failure of the United States to go to war with Iraq in 2003 would have produced a lasting peace or would have postponed war. It may be said that Saddam would have pushed toward confrontation and war regardless of what might have been done. He brutally and patiently pushed his way to power in Iraq after which he impatiently and brutally made himself the dominant figure in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. In all these instances, he employed war and the threat of war as his principal tools. In short, Saddam was in every conceivable way a threat not only to his people but also to world peace. However, some individuals have argued that even though Saddam posed a threat to world peace and stability, he would have been contained through sanctions and no-fly zones which would have acted as deterrence (Hunt, 2008). This argument was advanced even before the war even with the belief that he had weapons of mass destruction. For the majority of Americans, the question of whether the war was worth fighting revolves around whether the weapons of mass destruction were recovered or not. However, the major issue is whether Saddam could have been contained. Even though the war in Iraq has remained unpopular, the Iraqi people can claim some success with regard to the introduction of democracy. With the help of the United States, the Iraqi people have been successful in establishing the first Arab democracy. This is a major achievement with regard to the war on terror and for the purpose of liberty. The different ethnic and religious groups can now work together in a national army. They have made important steps in repossessing their country from the insurgents that have invaded their homeland. The Iraqi troops are solely responsible for clearing the Basra and Sadr City. The oppressive regime of Saddam Hussein was ousted. Conclusion The main difference between Obama and Bush on Iraq war lies in the objective of the invasion. The bushs administration saw it as a war against terrorism while Obama felt that there were better ways of fighting terrorism rather than invading Iraq. A sensible argument for the invasion was not that Saddam was about to attack anyone with a nuclear bomb. It was that the preservation of containment would nit have been indefinite and that Saddam was defying the international community repeatedly and that this defiance seemed to both the Clinton and Bush administration to be succeeding gradually. It may therefore be argued that if the Bush administration would have not gone to war then the United States would have faced a more daring and dangerous Saddam Hussein. References Ambinder, M. (2007, April 21). Obama’s Iraq evolution. National Journal, 39(16), 79-80. Retrieved on March 29, 2009 from EBSCO host database. Hamilton, W. (2004, April 17). Bush began to plan war three months after 9/11. The Washington Post, p. A01. Holtzman, E. (2006). The impeachment of George W. Bush; A handbook for concerned citizens, New York: Nation Books. Hunt, T. (2008. March 18). Bush: Iraq war worth it. The Huffington Post, Moore, J. (2004). Bushs war for reelection: Iraq, the White House, and the people. John Wiley Obama, B. (2002, October). Barrack Obama’s 2002 speech against the Iraq war. Retrieved on April 23, 2009, Responsibly ending the war in Iraq. (n. d. ). The White House. Stone, M. (2009, May 9). Bush 2007 v. Obama 2009? The Global Buzz. Retrieved on March 29, 2009,

Friday, September 20, 2019

Role of Institutions in Policy Making

Role of Institutions in Policy Making INTRODUCTION The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of institutions in influencing policy outcomes. First part of the paper provides a brief introduction to the study of institutions in political science. This is followed by description of factors influencing policy outcomes. Final part of the paper looks at the limitations of institutions, which pose additional constraints on policy outcomes. INSTITUTIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE The study of institutions is central to the subject matter of political science and, to an even greater extent, public administration. According to Lowndes (1996:181), â€Å"focus upon institutional arrangements for the delivery of public services is generally held to be defining of the sub-discipline of public administration†. March and Olsen (1984) argue that social, political, and economic institutions have recently become larger, more complex and resourceful, and therefore more important to collective life. According to them, attention to political institutions has increased in the literature on legislatures, budgets, public policymaking, local government and political elites. According to Scharpf (1989), much of comparative political science research may be characterised as an attempt to explain and predict the influence of political institutions on the choice of public policy. INFLUENCING POLICY OUTCOMES SETTING NORMS IN DECISION MAKING March and Olsen (1984,1989) see institutions as providing order in political life. Institutions increase capability by reducing comprehensiveness. Institutions express norms of decision-making and behaviour, providing a logic of appropriateness. Rules produce variation and deviation as well as conformity and standardisation. Institutions generally change in an incremental way through responding to environmental signals. AFFECTING POLICY OUTCOMES Institutions are often seen as â€Å"set of factors affecting the interactions between policy actors and hence the greater or lesser capacity of policy-making systems to adopt and implement effective responses to policy problems (Scharpf 2000:764)†. According to Gorges (2001), the European Commission and other EC institutions played a significant role in social policy-making. The European Commission sought to increase both its policy domain and its legitimacy, continually insisting that it would not abdicate its power to initiate policy. Although it is actors that are the proximate causes of policy responses, institutional conditions, to the extent that they are able to influence actor choices, are seen as remote causes. Actors are strongly influenced by the institutional rules to which they owe their existence and by institutional and cultural norms that define the criteria of their success or failure (Scharpf 2000). According to Scharpf (2000:770), â€Å"in sociological ins titutionalism, institutions are defined very broadly so as to include not only externally imposed and sanctioned rules but also unquestioned routines and standard operating procedures and, more important, socially constructed and culturally taken-for-granted worldviews and shared normative notions of appropriateness. In that view, therefore, institutions will define not only what actors can do but also their perceptions and preferences—and thus what they will want to do. Institutions constrain, but do not completely determine, policy choices (Scharpf 1989). Certain policy options are unlikely to be chosen under certain institutional conditions. According to Scharpf (1989), policy choices are simultaneously influenced by at least four sets of factors, institutional, situational, preferential and perceptional. Institutional rules will affect policy by restricting options, constituting actor constellations, regulating their modes of interaction and by structuring the incentives of the participating actors (Scharpf 2000). Institutions are imposing substantive prohibitions to policy outcomes. Countries differ in the range of institutionally permissible policy options and there is an increasing tightness of international legal constraints. For example, the power of governments to determine wages and working time was routinely exercised by most countries but is ruled out in Germany. Moreover, the tight control of capital transfers and the highly discriminatory regulation of credit markets that facilitated the success of macroeconomic full-employment strategies in Sweden until the mid-1980s would now be ruled out by EU directives liberalising capital markets and financial services. The rules of negative integration, in particular European competition law, have become a major constraint on all ec onomic policy options that could be construed as inhibiting or distorting free competition in the markets of EU member states. Institutional rules also define the constellations of actors that may participate in the adoption and implementation of policy responses and their permissible modes of interaction, which could be classified as mutual adjustment, negotiated agreement, voting, or hierarchical direction. Although most policy choices result from multi-actor interactions, some countries whose political institutions approximate the ideal Westminster model have the option of treating any major policy problem in a single- actor constellation. Here, all relevant policy choices are potentially determined by the preferences and perceptions prevailing in a unified action center. Hierarchical direction becomes an institutionally available mode of interaction, as exemplified in Britain, New Zealand, and possibly France. In rational-choice institutionalism, incentives are defined by refere nce to the self-interest of the corporate and collective actors involved in the policy process, for example, governments, political parties, central banks, labor unions, their subunits, or the individuals acting for them. In single-actor systems, the incentives that have the most direct effect on policy choices are constituted by the mechanisms of political accountability. In multi-actor systems, accountability is weakened and policy outcomes are more affected by incentives favoring cooperation or conflict between the veto actors. CRITICAL JUNCTURES AND DEVELOPMENTAL PATHWAYS Ikenberry (1994) characterises political development as involving critical junctures and developmental pathways. According to the first principle, different founding moments of institutional formation send countries along broadly different developmental paths. The second principle suggests that institutions continue to evolve in response to changing environmental conditions and ongoing political maneuvering but in ways that are constrained by past trajectories. According to Thelen (1999), where state-builders faced geopolitical competition early, they were forced into greater concessions to the financiers, merchants, and administrators who financed and staffed the bureaucracy, resulting in patrimonial systems. Where rulers confronted geopolitical pressures later, they found themselves in a quite different world, where developments in education and finance made these side payments unnecessary, resulting in greater bureaucratic autonomy. Over time, some avenues of policy become increas ingly blocked, if not entirely cut off, as decisions at one point in time can restrict future possibilities by sending policy off onto particular tracks (Thelen 1999). DIFFERENT THEORETICAL APPROACHES Although it is generally accepted that challenges to which policy actors may have to respond are influenced by the institutional setting, the dominant strands of current institutionalist theorising, rational-choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, differ in their conceptualisation of these influences (Scharpf 2000). LIMITATIONS Institutions have limitations which have a significant effect on policy outcomes. These limitations are focus on structures and efficiency, focus on stability, political manipulation and policy networking. FOCUS ON STRUCTURES AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY It has been argued that compliance with structures and practices often becomes more important than its actual efficacy (Lowndes 1996). According to DiMaggio and Powell (1991), it is the demand for similarity of structure and functioning, rather than for increased efficiency, that drives organisational change. According to Thelen (1999), the institutional approach begins with the observation that markets, embedded in political and social institutions, are the creation of governments and politics. The main purpose and effect of institutions are often seen as economising on fraction costs. Lowndes (1996:186) describes institutions as â€Å"efficient organisational frameworks, which arise to solve problems of complex economic exchange†. The critics of the new institutional economics, however, object to the proposal that a universal economic logic determines the choice of institutional systems, regardless of culture and circumstance or power and politics (Lowndes 1996). FOCUS ON STABILITY North (1990) stresses stability rather than efficiency as the economic rationale for institutions, arguing that technically inefficient institutions persist because they contribute to stability and harmony in interaction and because they are deeply embedded in culture and tradition. According to historical institutionalism, institutions do more than channel policy and structure political conflict. Thelen (1999) claims that institutions are socially constructed in the sense that they embody shared cultural understandings of the way the world works. This means that even when policy makers set out to redesign institutions, they are constrained in what they can conceive of by these embedded, cultural constraints. For example, the evolution of Japanese security policy shows how collectively held norms define appropriate conduct, shape actor identities, and influence actor interests, and in doing so, inform how political actors define what they want to accomplish (Thelen 1999). Pearson (20 00) claims that path dependence can be used to explain the analysis of European party systems, labor incorporation in Latin America, the outcome of state-building processes in Europe, and the comparative development of health care systems. According to Thelen (1999), the problem with this approach is that dominant cultural norms emerge out of concrete political conflicts, in which different groups fight over which norms will prevail. Dominant policy paradigms can and do shift at times and organisational fields are often imposed by powerful actors. According to Stinchcombe (1997), it is legitimacy and not automaticity that explains why people follow scripts in the first place. Furthermore, the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice (Pearson 2000). The conception of path dependence, in which preceding steps in a particular direction induce further movement in the same direction, is well captured by the idea of increasing returns. In an increasing returns process, the probability of further steps along the same path increases with each move down that path because of the costs associated with exit or change. According to North (1990), institutions induce self-rei nforcing processes that make reversals of course increasingly unattractive over time. This, according to Arthur (1994) leads to unpredictability, inflexibility, nonergodicity and potential path inefficiency. POLITICAL MANIPULATION In politics, institutional constraints are ubiquitous (Pierson 2000). Politics involves struggles over the authority to establish, enforce and change the rules governing social action in a particular territory. According to Gorges (2001), the institutional change could be influenced by material and ideal incentives the policy entrepreneurs provide. Furthermore, change is most likely when there is an increase in the effectiveness of individuals seeking change and a decrease in the blocking power of individuals whose interests are served by the current institutional arrangements. Institutions are not neutral coordinating mechanisms but in fact reflect, and also reproduce and magnify, particular patterns of power distribution in politics (Thelen 1999). Thus, political arrangements and policy feedbacks actively facilitate the organisation and empowerment of certain groups while actively disarticulating and marginalising others. â€Å"Manipulated by utility-maximising politicians and bur eaucrats, institutions degenerate over time. They come to serve the individual, private interests of officials and any conception of the public interest is lost (Lowndes 1996:188)†. Public officials seek to augment their status and material through increases to budgets under their control, and utility-seeking politicians attempt to maximise votes by promising benefits and service enhancements, which results in waste and over-supply of government goods and services (Niskanen 1973). An alternative to the budget-maximising thesis is provided by bureau-shaping theory which accepts that bureaucrats are self-serving, but denies that they pursue a single course of utility-maximising action (Lowndes 1996). In rational-choice institutionalism, institutional rules are understood as external constraints and incentives structuring the purposeful choices of self-interested rational actors (Scharpf 2000). Thus, when certain actors are in a position to impose rules on others, the employment of power may be self-reinforcing (Pierson 2000). Actors may use political authority to generate changes in both formal institutions and various public policies designed to enhance their power. Skocpol (1992) argues that institutional arrangements affect the capabilities of various groups to achieve self-consciousness, organise, and make alliances. For example, the fragmentation of the state, as well as the organisation of party competition along patronage lines, actively mediated against the development of a unified working class that could then spearhead the movement for comprehensive social policies in the United States. Scharpf (2000) does not agree with this notion, arguing that actor preferences have at least two dimensions individual and organisational self-interest on one hand and normative obligations and aspirations on the other. INSTITUTIONS AND THE â€Å"POLICY NETWORKING† The policy network approach is concerned with the institutionalisation of relations between governmental and non-governmental actors (Lowndes 1996). The concern is with actual institutional practices rather than with formal organisational arrangements. Jordan (1990) refers to an institution as an extra-constitutional policy-making arrangement between industries and clientelistic groups. Lowndes (1996) points to the traditionally fragmented structure of British government and the influential role played by interest groups in policy-making. In such environment, â€Å"policy is made not by a unified government machine but by an assortment of actors, governmental and nongovernmental, linked together in more or less formal and coherent networks (Lowndes 1996:190)†. Furthermore, institutions are embedded in networks of other institutions, and it is difficult to change one institution in a matrix because of this embeddedness. According to Lowndes (1996), policy networks routinise rel ationships, promoting continuity and stability. One example is the EU, where the European Commission has often granted access to, and attempted to institutionalise the participation of interest groups as a way of securing legitimacy for its proposals before presenting them to the Council of Ministers (Gorges 2001). The Commission has attempted to sustain and expand the Community political system by providing information to the social partners, forcing them to re-evaluate their interests and priorities, and supporting the development of a Community/Union system of interest intermediation by providing a forum for conflict resolution. The capacity for effective policy responses is affected not only by the quantity and quality but also by the diversity of policy-relevant information and analysis provided by an institutionalised information infrastructure (Scharpf 2000). Policy coordination in Austria, for example, was greatly facilitated by the fact that the government, the political parties, and the social partners relied on the analyses provided by a single economic research institute. In Germany, by contrast, unions and employers maintain separate research institutes, the federal government supports altogether six such institutes, the federal labor administration and the Bundesbank maintain large in-house research capacities, the independent Council of Economic Advisors relies on its own research staff, and the big commercial banks have their own macroeconomic research departments. The downside of the monopoly model is the risks of groupthink, or the failure to pay attention to observations, interpretations, and recommendations that do not conform to the dominant worldview (Scharpf 2000). This was arguably the case in Britain in the early 1970s, when policy makers in the treasury continued to rely on the Keynesian recommendations derived from the single macroeconomic simulation model, even when the economy had ceased to respond as predicted (Scharpf 2000). However, when the analyses of institutionalised information monopolists do fit the problem, they will facilitate effective problem solving in single-actor systems and effective coordination in multiactor systems. The pluralistic model, by contrast, will provide protection against the institutionalisation of error. CONCLUSION The paper has explored the role of institutions in influencing policy outcomes. Institutional conditions, to the extent that they are able to influence actor choices, are seen as remote causes. Institutions influence policy outcomes by setting norms in decision making. 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